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Developing security-critical systems is difﬁcult and there are many well-known exam-
ples of security weaknesses exploited in practice. Thus a sound methodology supporting
secure systems development is urgently needed. In particular, an important missing link
in the construction of secure systems is ﬁnding a practical way to create reliably secure
crypto protocol implementations. We present an approach that aims to address this need
by making use of a domain-speciﬁc language for crypto protocol implementations. One
can use this language to construct a compact and precise yet executable representation
of a cryptographic protocol. This high-level program can be veriﬁed against the security
goals using automated theorem provers for ﬁrst order logic. One can then use it to provide
assurance for legacy implementations of crypto protocols by generating test-cases.
© 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Modern society and modern economies rely on infrastructures for communication, ﬁnance, energy distribution, and
transportation. These infrastructures depend increasingly on networked information systems. Attacks against these systems
can threaten the economical or even physicalwell-being of people and organizations. Due to thewidespread interconnection
of information systems, attacks can be waged anonymously and from a safe distance. Many security incidents have been
reported, sometimes with potentially quite severe consequences. Any support to aid secure systems development is thus
dearly needed. In particular, it would be desirable to consider security aspects already in the design phase, before a system
is actually implemented, since removing security ﬂaws in the design phase saves cost and time.
With respect to crypto-based software (such as crypto-protocols or software somehow making use of cryptographic
signatures), a lot of very successful work has been done to formally analyze abstract speciﬁcations of these protocols
for security design weaknesses. What is still largely missing is an approach which analyzes implementations of crypto-
based systems for security weaknesses. This is necessitated by the fact that so far, crypto-based software is usually not
generated automatically from formal speciﬁcations. Thus, evenwhere the corresponding speciﬁcations are formally veriﬁed,
the implementations may still contain vulnerabilities related to the insecure use of cryptographic algorithms. An example
for a crypto-protocol whose design had been formally veriﬁed for security and whose implementation was later found to
contain a weakness with respect to its use of cryptographic algorithms can be found in [31].
Towards this goal, we present an approach that aims to address this need bymaking use of a domain-speciﬁc language for
crypto protocol implementations. One canuse this language to construct a compact andprecise yet executable representation
of a cryptographic protocol. This high-level program can be veriﬁed against the security goals using automated theorem
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provers for ﬁrst order logic. One can then use it to provide assurance for legacy implementations of crypto protocols by
generating test-cases. As a running example, we use a variant of the Internet security protocol TLS.
The currentwork is part of awider initiative toprovidemethods formodel-based security engineeringof software, initially
mostly targeted to the model level (see [16,17,20]). The current work tries to bridge the gap to the implementation level by
offering to use a domain-speciﬁc language for crypto-protocol which is executable (and therefore directly usable e.g. to gen-
erate test-sequences for legacy implementations of crypto protocols), but abstract enough for an efﬁcient, automated formal
veriﬁcation. Since the language is based on the paradigm of stream-processing functions, a number of useful techniques
are available from that paradigm which we use as well to reason about programs on the language level, such as reﬁnement
and rely-guarantee properties of programs in the language (see e.g. [8,7] for a general introduction to these concepts in the
context of stream-processing functions). We show that these notions preserve the security properties considered in this
paper.
Section 2 presents the domain-speciﬁc language for cryptographic protocols. Section 3 explains how one can formalize
the security property of data secrecy in this context. Section 4 shows how to make use of the various notions of reﬁnement
available from the paradigm of stream-processing functions here. Section 5 introduces the running application of this paper,
the variant of the security protocol TLS proposed in [3]. Section 6 explains how to construct a secure channel making use
of the DSL at the hand of the TLS variant. Section 7 explains how to translate DSL programs to ﬁrst-order logic formulas.
In Section 7.1, we explain the translation at the hand of a variant of the Internet protocol TLS. Section 7.2 explains how to
perform the security analysis using the automated theorem prover. Section 8 explains how we generate concrete test cases.
We close with comparisons to related work and a discussion of our work.
2. A domain-speciﬁc language for cryptographic protocols
In this section, we introduce the domain-speciﬁc language for cryptographic protocols, which is based on the stream-
processing function paradigm (cf. [8] for a general introduction).
Speciﬁcally, we consider concurrently executing processes interacting by transmitting sequences of data values over
unidirectional FIFO communication channels. Communication is asynchronous in the sense that transmission of a value
cannot be prevented by the receiver (note that one may implement synchronous communication using handshakes
[8]).
Processes are collections of programs that communicate through channels, with the constraint that for each of its output
channels c a given process P contains exactly one program pc that outputs on c. This program pc may take input from any of
P’s input channels. Intuitively, the program is a description of a value to be output on the channel c in round n + 1, computed
from values found on channels in round n. Local state can be maintained through the use of feedback channels, and used for
iteration (for instance, for coding while loops).
Note that all programs (one for each output channel) that are used to deﬁne a process are executed synchronously while
the process is running, in the sense that they progress in lockstep (i.e., at each time interval, each program performs exactly
one computation step, all in parallel). In contrast, different processes that are executed concurrently are executed such that
they are linked to each other in an asynchronous way, in the sense that if one process communicates with another, this is
done in an asynchronous fashion (i.e., the sender of a message proceeds with its own execution independently of whether
or when the receiver processes that message).
We assume disjoint sets D of data values, Secret of unguessable values (such as “nonces” – freshly generated values
supposed to be used only once –, other random values, session keys, or similar), Keys of keys, Channels of channels and Var
of variables.Write Enc
def= Keys ∪ Channels ∪ Var for the set of encryptors thatmay be used for encryption or decryption. The
values communicated over channels are formal expressions built from variables, values on input channels, and data values
using concatenation. Precisely, the set Exp of expressions contains the empty expression ε and the non-empty expressions
generated by the grammar given in Fig. 1.
An occurrence of a channel name c refers to the value found on c at the previous instant. The empty expression ε denotes
absence of output on a channel at a given point in time. We write CExp for the set of closed expressions (those containing
no subterms in Var ∪ Channels). We write the decryption key corresponding to an encryption key K as K−1. In the case of
asymmetric encryption, the encryption key K is public, and K−1 secret. For symmetric encryption, K and K−1 may coincide.
We assume DecK−1 ({E}K ) = E for all E ∈ Exp,K ,K−1 ∈ Keys and ExtK (SignK−1 (E)) = E for all E ∈ Exp,K ,K−1 ∈ Keys (and we
assume that no other equations except those following from these hold, unless stated otherwise).
Programs in the DSL are then deﬁned by the grammar given in Fig. 2. Note that the grammar in particular includes a non-
deterministic choice operator. This allows one to use the DSL notation also for speciﬁcationswhich admit underspeciﬁcation,
as will be explained in later sections.
In the DSL grammar, variables are introduced in case constructs, which determine their values. The ﬁrst case construct
tests whether E is a key; if so, p is executed, otherwise p′. The second case construct tests whether E is a list with head x and
tail y; if so, p is evaluated, using the actual values of x, y; if not, p′ is evaluated. In the second case construct, x and y are bound
variables. A program is closed if it contains no unbound variables. while loops can be coded using feedback channels.
From each assignment of expressions to channel names c ∈ Channels appearing in a program p (called its input channels),
p computes an output expression.
56 J. Jürjens / Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming 78 (2009) 54–73
Fig. 1. Grammar for simple expressions in the domain-speciﬁc language.
Fig. 2. Grammar for programs in the domain-speciﬁc language.
For simpliﬁcationwe assume that in the following all programs arewell-formed in the sense that each encryption {E}e and
decryptionDece(E) appears as part of p in a case E′ of key do p else p′ construct (unless e ∈ Keys), to ensure that only keys are
used to encrypt or decrypt. It is straightforward to enforce this using a type system.
Example. Theprogram case c of key do {d}c else ε outputs the value received at channeld encryptedunder the value received
on channel c if that value is a key, otherwise it outputs ε.
A process is of the form P = (I,O, L, (pc)c∈O∪L) where
• I ⊆ Channels is called the set of its input channels and
• O ⊆ Channels the set of its output channels,
...
...
...
L
I
O
P
and where for each c ∈ O˜ def= O ∪ L, pc is a closed program with input channels in I˜ def= I ∪ L (where L ⊆ Channels is called the
set of local channels). From inputs on the channels in I˜ at a given point in time, pc computes the output on the channel c.
Wewrite IP ,OP and LP for the sets of input, output and local channels of P,KP ⊆ Keys for the set of private keys and SP ⊆ Secret
for the set of unguessable values (such as nonces) occurring in P. We assume that different processes have disjoint sets of
local channels, keys and secrets. Local channels are used to store local state between the execution rounds.
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Fig. 3. Deﬁnition of [p]( M).
2.1. Stream-processing functions
Since we aim to assign a formal interpretation to programs in our DSL using stream-processing functions, we recall the
deﬁnitions of streams and stream-processing functions from [6,8] in this section.
We write StreamC
def= (CExp∞)C (where C ⊆ Channels) for the set of C-indexed tuples of (ﬁnite or inﬁnite) sequences of
closed expressions. The elements of this set are called streams, speciﬁcally input streams (resp. output streams) if C denotes
the set of non-local input (resp. output) channels of a process P. Each stream s ∈ StreamC consists of components s(c) (for
each c ∈ C) that denote the sequence of expressions appearing at the channel c. The nth element xn in such a sequence
s(c) = (x1, x2, x3, . . . , xn, . . .) consisting of expressions x1, x2, x3, . . . , xn, . . . is the expression appearing at time t = n.
A function f : StreamI → P(StreamO) from streams to sets of streams is called a stream-processing function.
The composition of two stream-processing functions fi : StreamIi → P(StreamOi ) (i = 1, 2) withO1 ∩ O2 = ∅ is deﬁned as
f1 ⊗ f2 : StreamI → P(StreamO)
(with I = (I1 ∪ I2) \ (O1 ∪ O2), O = (O1 ∪ O2) \ (I1 ∪ I2)).
... ...
... ...
I1 I2
f1 f2
O1 O2
where f1 ⊗ f2(s) def= {tO : tI = sI ∧ tOi ∈ fi(sIi ) (i = 1, 2)} (where t ranges over StreamI∪O). For t ∈ StreamC and C ′ ⊆ C, the
restriction tC ′ ∈ StreamC ′ is deﬁned by tC ′ (c) = t(c) for each c ∈ C ′. Since the operator⊗ is associative and commutative [8],
we can deﬁne a generalised composition operator
⊗
i∈I fi for a set {fi : i ∈ I} of stream-processing functions.
Example. If f : Stream{a} → P(Stream{b}), f (s) def= {0.s, 1.s}, is the stream-processing function with input channel a and
output channelb that outputs the input streampreﬁxedwitheither0or1, andg : Stream{b} → P(Stream{c}), g(s) def= {0.s, 1.s},
the function with input (resp. output) channel b (resp. c) that does the same, then the composition f⊗g : Stream{a} →
P(Stream{c}), f⊗g(s) = {0.0.s, 0.1.s, 1.0.s, 1.1.s}, outputs the input stream preﬁxed with either of the 2-element streams
0.0, 0.1, 1.0 or 1.1.
2.2. Associating a stream-processing function to a process
A process P = (I,O, L, (pc)c∈O) is modelled by a stream-processing function [[P]] : StreamI → P(StreamO) from input
streams to sets of output streams.
For honest processes P, [[P]] is by construction strictly causal, which means that the (n + 1)st expression in any output
sequence depends only on the ﬁrst n input expressions. As pointed out in [30], adversaries can not be assumed to behave
causally in that strict sense: Given a worst-case scenario, the speed of the adversary machine may exceed the speed of the
“honest” machine to an extent that the adversary behavior appears instantaneous from the point of view of the honest
machine. Therefore for an adversary Awe need a slightly different interpretation [[A]]r (called sometimes rushing adversaries
in [30]), which we will deﬁne further below at the end of this section.
For any closed program p with input channels in I˜
def= I ∪ L and any I˜-indexed tuple of closed expressions M ∈ CExpI˜ we
deﬁne a set of expressions [p]( M) ∈ P(CExp) in Fig. 3, so that [p]( M) is the expression that results from running p once, when
the channels have the initial values given in M.
We write E( M) for the result of substituting each occurrence of c ∈ I˜ in E by M(c) and p[E/x] for the outcome of replacing
each free occurrence of x in process P with the term E, renaming variables to avoid capture.
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Thenanyprogrampc (for c ∈ Channels) deﬁnes a strictly causal stream-processing function [pc] : StreamI˜ → P(Stream{c})
as follows. Given s ∈ Stream
I˜
, let [pc](s) consist of those t ∈ Stream{c} such that
• t0 ∈ [pc](ε, . . . , ε);
• tn+1 ∈ [pc](sn) for each n ∈ N.
Finally, a process P = (I,O, L, (pc)c∈O˜) (where O˜
def= O ∪ L) is interpreted as the composition [[P]] def= ⊗
c∈O˜[pc].
Similarly, any pc (with c ∈ Channels) deﬁnes a stream-processing function [pc]r : StreamI˜ → P(Stream{c}) as follows,
which is not strictly causal. Given s ∈ Stream
I˜
and c /∈ I˜, let [pc]r(s) consist of those t ∈ Stream{c} such that tn ∈ [pc]r(sn) for
each n ∈ N.
An adversary A = (I,O, L, (pc)c∈O˜) is then interpreted as the composition:
[[A]]r def=
⊗
c∈O[pc]r ⊗
⊗
l∈O˜\O[pl].
Thus the programs with outputs on the non-local channels are deﬁned to be rushing. Note that at the local channels an
adversary still shows strictly causal behaviour (which ensures that the above deﬁnition is actually well-deﬁned). This does
not mean that it is limited in power, however: The adversary is able to arbitrarily delay the further execution of a protocol
(by waiting with forwarding a message to the intended receipient for an arbitrary number of time steps) which allows him
to perform further computations on the data he already has. He is also able to store arbitrary amounts of data in any of his
local channels (by building up arbitrarily large expressions).
Example.
• [if DecK ′ ({0}K ) = 0 then 0 else 1](s) = (0, 0, 0, . . .) iff K = K ′
• Assume that l, o, and i are channel names. For the process P with IP = {i}, OP = {o} and LP = {l} and with pl def= inp(l) ::
inp(i) (that is, the concatenation of the input values received at the channels l and i) and po def= inp(l) :: inp(i) we have
[[P]](s) = {(ε, s0, s0 :: s1, s0 :: s1 :: s2, . . .)} and [[P]]r(s) = {(s0, s0 :: s1, s0 :: s1 :: s2, . . .)}.
3. Secrecy
We say that a stream-processing function f : Stream∅ → P(StreamO) may eventually output an expression E ∈ CExp if
there exists a stream t ∈ f (*) (where * denotes the sole element in Stream∅), a channel c ∈ O and an index j ∈ N such that
(t(c))j = E.
Deﬁnition 1. We say that a process P leaks a secret m ∈ Secret ∪ Keys if there is a process A with IA ⊆ OP , IP ⊆ OA and
m /∈ SA ∪ KA such that [[P]]⊗[[A]]r may eventually outputm. Otherwise we say that P preserves the secrecy of m.
The idea of this deﬁnition is that P preserves the secrecy of m if no adversary can ﬁnd out m in interaction with P. Note
that for a process A to be able to output the secretm on its output channel, it needs to “ﬁnd it out” ﬁrst. Conversely, if there
is a process A which is able to “ﬁnd out” m, there is a process A′ which does output m on its output channel. In that sense,
“ﬁnding out” the secret and sending it out are equivalent (and we choose to formalize secrecy by referring to an output of
A because this simpliﬁes the deﬁnition). In our formulation m is either an atomic secret value or a key. This is sufﬁcient in
practice, since the secrecy of a compound expression can be reduced to the secrecy of a key or an atomic secret value [1]:
Depending on the circumstances, one can deﬁne the compound expression to be secret if at least one, or alternatively if all
its parts remain secret. Because we want to be able to use both alternatives, we only give a deﬁnition for atomic values here
and leave it up to the user to apply it to compound values as may seem ﬁt.
Note, also, that this deﬁnition is intended to be usedwith “complete” speciﬁcations, as opposed to “partial” speciﬁcations
which might for example only deﬁne one role in a protocol. There may also be the possibility of deﬁning secrecy for such
“partial” speciﬁcations. However, to be useful this would raise the issue of the preservation of the notion of secrecy by
composition. Although that would be a very interesting question, it is beyond the scope of the current paper, and therefore
here we only consider secrecy for “complete” speciﬁcations which model an entire protocol, in the sense that all non-local
channels are accessible to the adversary.
Note, however, that the decision to focus on “complete” speciﬁcations in this paper only restricts the process of construct-
ing and verifying speciﬁcations, in the sense that the veriﬁcation can only be done when the speciﬁcation is complete, at
least at a high level of abstraction (cf. later sections for how to use reﬁnement techniques to add more details). It does not in
itself restrict the systems and the security properties that can be analyzed. For example, it is still possible to consider parallel
sessions of a protocol for the purpose of the security analysis, whose number is bounded by an arbitrary number n which
needs to be chosen before performing the analysis. To do this, one parameterizes the protocol speciﬁcation with respect to
a value which uniquely identiﬁes a session (such as a session number of session key), and then consider the composition of
these parameterized speciﬁcations.
It is also possible to analyze a speciﬁcation against an adversary that may take a role in the given protocol: The behavior
of the component A in the above deﬁnition is not constrained. In particular, it can execute any role in any protocol, assuming
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it has the knowledge of the relevant data values (such as keys) that are needed to do so. This knowledge can be provided to
the adversary using suitable input channels. This is demonstrated at the hand of the example of the TLS variant given further
below.
Example.
• p def= {m}K :: K does not preserve the secrecy ofm or K , but p def= {m}K does.
• pl def= case inp(c) of key do {m}inp(c) else ε (where c ∈ Channels)doesnotpreserve thesecrecyofm, butP def= ({c}, {e}, {l}, (pl , pe))
(where pe
def= {inp(l)}K ) does.
Since our language is based on the paradigm of stream-processing functions, a number of useful techniques are available
from that paradigm which we use as well to reason about programs on the language level, such as reﬁnement and rely-
guarantee properties of programs in the language (see e.g. [8] for a general introduction to these concepts in the context of
stream-processing functions). We start with these by deﬁning a rely-guarantee condition for secrecy.
Given a relation C ⊆ StreamO × StreamI and a process AwithO ⊆ IA and I ⊆ OA we say that A fulﬁls C if for every s ∈ StreamIA
and every t ∈ [[A]](s), we have (sO, tI) ∈ C.
Deﬁnition 2. Given a relation C ⊆ StreamOP × StreamIP from output streams of a process P to input streams of P, we say
that P leaks m assuming C (for m ∈ Secret ∪ Keys) if there exists a process A with m /∈ SA ∪ KA that fulﬁls C and such that
[[P]]⊗[[A]]r may eventually outputm.
Otherwise P preserves the secrecy of m assuming C.
This deﬁnition is useful if P is a component of a larger system S that is assumed to fulﬁl the rely-condition, or if the
adversary is assumed to be unable to violate it.
Example. p
def= if inp(c) = password then secret else εpreserves thesecrecyof secret assumingC = {(t, s) : ∀n.sn /= password}.
4. Reﬁnement
Another family of important techniques availablewithin the paradigm of stream-processing functions, besides the notion
of rely-guarantee properties used above, is that of different kinds of reﬁnement deﬁned in [8]. We deﬁne these notions of
reﬁnement and exhibit conditions under which they preserve our proposed secrecy properties.
4.1. Property reﬁnement
Deﬁnition 3. For processes P and P′ with IP = IP′ and OP = OP′ we deﬁne P P′ if for each s ∈ StreamIP , [[P]](s) ⊇ [[P′]](s).
Example. (either p or q) p and (either p or q) q for any programs p, q.
Theorem 1.
• If P preserves the secrecy of m and P P′ then P′ preserves the secrecy of m.
• If P preserves the secrecy of m assuming C (for any C ⊆ StreamOP × StreamIP ) and P P′ then P′ preserves the secrecy of
m assuming C.
Proof. The proof follows immediately from the deﬁnitions of secrecy and reﬁnement, since secrecy is deﬁned over the set of
communicated values, and this set can only be reduced when using reﬁnement. 
4.2. Interface reﬁnement
Deﬁnition 4. Let P1, P2,D and U be processes with IP1 = ID, OD = IP2 , OP2 = IU and OU = OP1 .
We deﬁne P1
(D,U)
 P2 to hold if P1 D ⊗ P2 ⊗ U.
D U
P1
P2
60 J. Jürjens / Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming 78 (2009) 54–73
Example. Suppose we have
• P1 = ({c}, {d}, pd def= if inp(c) = 1 then 2 else 3),
• P2 = ({c′}, {d′}, pd′ def= if inp(c′) = 4 then 5 else 6),
• D = ({c}, {c′}, pc′ def= if inp(c) = 1 then 4 else ε) and
• U = ({d′}, {d}, pd def= if inp(d′) = 5 then 2 else 3.
Then we have P1
(D,U)
 P2.
For the next preservation result we need the following concepts.
Given a stream s ∈ StreamX and a bijection ι : Y → X we write sι for the stream in StreamY obtained from s by renaming
the channel names using ι: sι(y) = s(ι(y)).
Given processes D,D′ with OD = ID′ and OD′ ∩ ID = ∅ and a bijection ι : OD′ → ID such that [[D]]⊗[[D′]](s) = {sι} for each
s ∈ StreamID , we say that D is a left inverse of D′ and D′ is a right inverse of D.
D D’
=
Example. pd
def= 0 :: inp(c) is a left inverse of pe def= case inp(c) of h :: t do t else ε.
We write S ◦ R def= {(x, z) : ∃y.(x, y) ∈ R ∧ (y, z) ∈ S} for the usual composition of relations R, S and generalize this to functions
f : X → P(Y) by viewing them as relations f ⊆ X × Y .
Theorem 2. Let P1, P2,D and U be processes with IP1 = ID, OD = IP2 ,OP2 = IU and OU = OP1 and such that D has a left inverse D′
and U a right inverse U ′. Let m ∈ (Secret ∪ Keys) \⋃Q∈{D′ ,U ′}(SQ ∪ KQ ).
• If P1 preserves the secrecy of m and P1
(D,U)
 P2 then P2 preserves the secrecy of m.
• If P1 preserves the secrecy of m assuming C ⊆ StreamOP1 × StreamIP1 and P1
(D,U)
 P2 then P2 preserves the secrecy of m
assuming [[U ′]] ◦ C ◦ [[D′]].
Proof. This statement follows directly from Theorem 1 and the deﬁnition of interface reﬁnement. 
4.3. Conditional reﬁnement
Deﬁnition 5. Let P1 and P2 be processeswith IP1 = IP2 andOP1 = OP2 .We deﬁne P1CP2 for a total relation C ⊆ StreamOP1 ×
StreamIP1
to hold if for each s ∈ StreamIP1 and each t ∈ [[P2]], (t, s) ∈ C implies t ∈ [[P1]].
Example. pC (if inp(c) = emergency then q else p) for C = {(t, s) : ∀n.sn /= emergency}.
Theorem 3. Given total relations C,D ⊆ StreamOP × StreamIP with C ⊆ D, if P preserves the secrecy ofmassuming C and PDP′
then P′ preserves the secrecy of m assuming C.
Proof. Again, this statement follows directly from Theorem 1 and the deﬁnition of conditional reﬁnement. 
5. A variant of the TLS protocol
To demonstrate usability of our domain-speciﬁc language, we specify a variant of the handshake protocol of TLS1 as
proposed in [3] (note that this is not the variant of TLS in common use). To show applicability of our approach, we exhibit
a security vulnerability, suggest a correction, and verify it. The goal of the protocol is to let a client send a secret over an
untrusted communication link to a server in a way that provides secrecy and server authentication, by using symmetric
session keys.
5.1. The handshake protocol
The central part of the speciﬁcation of this protocol is shown in Fig. 4. The two protocol participants client and server are
connected by an Internet connection. The value secret which is exchanged encrypted in the last message of the protocol is
required to remain secret.
1 TLS (transport layer security) is the successor of the Internet security protocol SSL (secure sockets layer).
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Fig. 4. Variant of the TLS handshake.
Depicted in Fig. 4, the protocol proceeds aswe explain in the following. Herewe assume that the setVar contains elements
argO,l,n for each O ∈ Obj(D) and numbers l and n, representing the nth argument of the operation that is supposed to be the
lth operation received by O according to the sequence diagram D.
The client C initiates the protocol by sending the message init(NC,KC,SignK−1C (C :: KC)) to the server S. Suppose that the
condition [tail(ExtK′ (cC))=K′] holds, where K ′ ::= argS,1,2 and cC ::=argS,1,3. That is, the key KC contained in the signature
matches the one transmitted in the clear. In that case, S sends the message resp
(
NS, {SignK−1S (K :: N
′)}K′ , SignK−1CA (S :: KS)
)
back to C (where N′ ::= argS,1,1). Then if the condition
[head(ExtKCA (cS)) = S ∧ tail(ExtK′′ (DecK−1C (ck))) = NC]
holds, where ck ::= argC,1,2, cS ::= argC,1,3, and K′′ ::=tail(ExtKCA (cS)) (that is, the certiﬁcate is actually for S and the correct
nonce is returned), C sends xchd({si}k) to S, where k ::= head(ExtK′′ (DecK−1C (ck))). If any of the checks fail, the respective
protocol participant stops the execution of the protocol.
The goal is thus to let a client C send a master secret m ∈ Secret to a server S in a way that provides conﬁdentiality and
server authentication.
The protocol uses both RSA encryption and signing. Thus in this and the following section we assume also the equation
{DecK−1 (E)}K = E to hold (for each E ∈ Exp and K ∈ Keys). We also assume that the set of data values D includes process
names such as C, S,Y , . . . and a message abort.
The protocol assumes that there is a secure (wrt integrity) way for C to obtain the public key KCA of the certiﬁcation
authority, and for S to obtain a certiﬁcate Sign
K−1
CA
(S :: KS) signed by the certiﬁcation authority that contains its name and
public key. The adversary may also have access to KCA, SignK−1
CA
(S :: KS) and SignK−1
CA
(Z :: KZ ) for an arbitrary process Z .
The channels between the participants are thus as follows.
Now we deﬁne the protocol using our domain-speciﬁc language (here and in the following we denote a program with
output channel c simply as c for readability).
c
def= if inp(l) = ε then NC :: KC :: SignK−1
C
(C :: KC )
else case inp(s′) of s1 :: s2 :: s3
do case Ext inp(aC )(s3) of S :: x
do if {Dec
K−1
C
(s2)}x = y :: NC then {m}y
else abort
else abort
else ε
l
def= 0
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s
def= case inp(c′) of c1 :: c2 :: c3
do case Extc2 (c3)of x :: c2 do NS :: {SignK−1
S
(KCS :: c1)}c2 :: inp(aS)
else abort
else ε
r
def= if DecKCS (inp(c′)) ∈ Data ∪ Secret then DecKCS (inp(c′)) else ε
aC
def= KCA
aA
def= KCA :: SignK−1
CA
(S :: KS) :: SignK−1
CA
(Z :: KZ )
aS
def= Sign
K−1
CA
(S :: KS)
For readability we leave out a time-stamp, a session id, the choice of cipher suite and compression method and the use
of a temporary key by S since these are not relevant for the weakness. We use syntactic sugar by extending the case list
construct to lists of ﬁnite length and by using pattern matching, and we also leave out some case of key do else constructs
to avoid cluttering. Similarly, we use the expression DecKCS (inp(c′)) ∈ Data ∪ Secret as a short-hand for nested if then else
statements which iteratively check equality of DecKCS (inp(c′)) with all values in the ﬁnite set Data ∪ Secret. Here the local
channel l of C only ensures that C initiates the handshake protocol only once (by sending out an arbitrarymessage (0) so that
only at the start of the program execution the ﬁrst condition in the deﬁnition of the program on channel c will hold). The
exchanged key is symmetric, i.e. we have K−1
CS
= KCS . The values sent on aA signify that we allow A to eavesdrop on aC and
aS and to obtain the certiﬁcate issued by CA of some third party. The local channel r of the server will contain the decrypted
secret (which is assumed to be a value in the set Data ∪ Secret) after it has been communicated successfully.
Note that the above speciﬁcations aims to perform a security analysis of a speciﬁc situation for the protocol, namely that
of a single parallel execution of each of the two protocol participants, and against an attacker that does not have control over
either of the participants. Although for simplicity, we focus on this scenario in this paper, we now shortly explain that our
approach is general enough to also consider multiple parallel sessions, and attackers that take on the role of one or more
protocol participants.
Multiple parallel sessions: to specify the situation where there are multiple parallel sessions, instead of just considering one
session key KCS and the associated client C and server S, we consider a set of session keys calK , a set of clients C, and a set
of servers S (which may each be inﬁnite), together with two functions kC : K → C and kS : K → S which determine which
client and server are involved in a given session, which is represented by the session key (which is unique to the session,
where the actual key generation is left implicit here). Each client C then has a local channel lC , input channels s
′
C
and aC , and
an output channel cC , as in the above ﬁgure. Similarly, each server S has channels as in the ﬁgure above, with names indexed
by S in the above way. The behavior of each channel C resp. each channel S is as deﬁned above, except that the session key
KCS is subtituted with the unique key K such that kC (K) = C and kS(K) = S (for all clients C resp. servers S which are in the
image of kC resp. kS , which means that they are part of a session in the scenario that is modelled).
Insider attackers: to specify the situation where the attacker is actually one of the protocol participants (as in the attack by
Lowe against the Needham-Schroeder protocol), we leave out the relevant protocol participant from the model (say, the
client C), and instead give the data that is contained in its speciﬁcation to the adversary, for example through an additional
input channel. In the case of the client, that would be the client‘s public key KC and private key K
−1
C
, his nonce NC , the public
key KCA of the certiﬁcation authority, and the session key KCS .
5.2. The ﬂaw
Theorem 4. P
def= C⊗S⊗CA does not preserve the secrecy of m.
We prove this theorem by exhibiting a successful attacker, the behaviour of which can itself be represented using our DSL
notation as follows:
c′ def= case inp(c) of c1 :: c2 :: c3
do c1 :: KA :: SignK−1
A
(C :: KA)
else ε
s′ def= case inp(s) of s1 :: s2 :: s3
do s1 :: {DecK−1
A
(s2)}KC :: s3
else ε
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Fig. 5. Attack against TLS variant.
lA
def= if inp(lA) = ε then case inp(s) of s1 :: s2 :: s3
do case {Dec
K−1
A
(s2)}KS of x1 :: x2 do x1 else inp(lA)
else inp(lA)
c0
def= case inp(lA) of key do if Decinp(lA)(inp(c)) = ⊥ then ε else Decinp(lA)(c) else ε
Proposition 1. [[P]]⊗[[A]]r eventually outputs m.
The validity of this statement is demonstrated by the man-in-the-middle attack scenario shown in the message ﬂow
diagram shown in Fig. 5.
5.3. The ﬁx
Let S′ be the process derived from S by substituting KCS :: c1 in the second line of the deﬁnition of s by KCS :: c1 :: c2. Change
C to C ′ by substituting y :: NC in the fourth line of the deﬁnition of c by y :: NC :: KC .
Theorem 5. P′ def= C ′ ⊗ S′ ⊗ CA preserves the secrecy of m.
Proof.Althoughwewill explain later in this sectionhowprotocolswritten in ourDSL canbe formally veriﬁed in an automated
way bymaking use of automated theorem provers for ﬁrst-order logic, here we additionally give an informal proof to explain
the intuition behind this kind of reasoning. 
Given an adversary A with m /∈ SA ∪ KA, we need to show that [[P′]]⊗[[A]]r does not eventually output m. We proceed
by execution rounds, making use of the fact that the adversary may let its output depend on the output from the honest
participants at the same time.
In every round, 0 is output on l, KCA on aC and aA, and SignK−1
CA
(S :: KS) on aS . After the ﬁrst round, the local storage of C
remains unchangedwhatever happens, and S and CA do not have a local storage. Thuswe only need to consider those actions
of A that immediately increase its knowledge (i.e. we need not consider outputs of A that prompt C or S to output ε or abort
in the following round.
In theﬁrst round,NC :: KC :: SignK−1
C
(C :: KC ) is output on c and ε on s. SinceA is not in possessionof anymessage containing
S’s name and signed by CA at this point, any output on s′ will prompt C to output ε or abort in the next round, so the output
on s′ is irrelevant. Similarly, the only relevant output on c′ is of the form c1 :: KX :: SignK−1
X
(Y :: KX ), where KX is a public key
with corresponding private key K−1X and Y a name of a process.
In the second round, the output on c is ε or abort, and that on s is ε or abort or NS :: {SignK−1
S
(KCS :: c1 :: KX )}KX :: aS .
The only possibility to cause C in the following round to produce a relevant output would be for A now to output a
message of the form NZ :: {SignK−1
Z
(KCS :: c1 :: KX )}KX :: SignK−1
CA
(S :: KZ ). Firstly, the only certiﬁcate from CA containing S
in possession of A is Sign
K−1
CA
(S :: KS). Secondly, the only message containing a message signed using KS in possession of
A is {Sign
K−1
S
(KCS :: c1 :: KX )}KX . In case KX /= KC the message signed by S is of the form SignK−1
S
(KCS :: c1 :: KX ) for KX /=
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KC , so that C outputs abort on receipt of this message anyhow. In case KX = KC , A cannot decrypt or alter the message
{Sign
K−1
S
(KCS :: c1 :: KC )}KC by assumptions on cryptography and since A does not possess K−1C . A may forward the message
on s′. In this case, C outputs {m}KCS in the following round, which A cannot decrypt.
Since the internal state of C, S and CA does not change after the ﬁrst round, further interaction does not bring any change
whatsoever (since it makes no difference if A successively tries different keys KX or names Y).
Thus P′ preserves the secrecy of x.
Note that the nonce NS is in fact not needed for establishing this claim.
Note also that, just as above we explained how the speciﬁcation of the TLS variant can be generalized to cover multiple
parallel sessions and insider attackers, the above informal proof can also be extended to cover thesemore general situations.
In the case of parallel sessions, one needs to investigate within the above proof, at any point of the protocol execution,
whether the adversary can use the additional knowledge from being involved in parallel session to break the protocol (which
is not the case, although we omit the details of this discussion here). In the case of insider attackers, it is easy to see that if
the attacker takes on the role of either the client or the server, it is straightforward for him to break the secrecy of the secret
in the course of a legal protocol execution, since he is in fact in possession of the session key.
6. Implementing secure channels
As an example for a stepwise development of a concrete program inourDSL fromanabstract speciﬁcation,we consider the
implementation of a secure channel W from a client C to a server S using the handshake protocol considered in Section 5.
The initial requirement is that a client C should be able to send a messagemsg on W with intended destination a server
S so thatmsg is not leaked to A. Before a security risk analysis the situation may simply be pictured as follows:
Since there are no unconnected output channels, the composition C⊗W⊗S obviously does not leakmsg.
Suppose that the risk analysis indicates that the transport layer over whichW is to be implemented is vulnerable against
active attacks. This leads to the following model.
We would like to implement the secure channel using the (corrected) variant of the TLS handshake protocol considered in
Section 5. Thus Pc resp. Ps are implemented by making use of the client resp. server side of the handshake protocol. Here we
only consider the client side:
We would like to provide an implementation Pc such that for each C with msg ∈ SC, C⊗Pc preserves the secrecy of msg
(where msg represents the message that should be sent to S). Of course, Pc should also provide functionality: perform the
initial handshake and then encrypt data fromC under the negotiated key K ∈ Keys and sent it out onto the network. As a ﬁrst
step, we may formulate the possible outputs of Pc as nondeterministic choices (in order to constrain the overall behaviour
of Pc). We also allow the possibility for Pc to signal toC the readiness to receive data to be sent over the network, by sending
ok on ci:
pc
def= either if inp(co) = ε then ε else {inp(co)}K
or cK
ci
def= either ε or ok
Here cK denotes the following adaption of the (corrected) program c deﬁned in Section 5 (for readability, we allow to use
syntactic “macros” here, the resulting program is obtained by “pasting” the following program text in the place of cK in the
deﬁnition of pc). For simplicity, we assume that Pc has already received the public key KCA of the certiﬁcation authority. We
leave out the deﬁnition of ci since at the moment we only consider the case where C wants to sent data to S:
cK
def= either NC :: KC :: SignK−1
C
(C :: KC )
or case inp(ac) of s1 :: s2 :: s3
do case ExtKCA (s3) of S :: x
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do if Extx(DecKC (s2)) = y :: NC :: KC then {K}y
else abort
else abort
else abort
One can show that for any C, the composition C⊗Pc preserves the secrecy of the messages sent along c0.
As a next step, we may split Pc into two components: the client side H of the handshake protocol (as part of the security
layer) and program P (in the application layer) that receives data fromC, encrypts it using the key received fromH and sends
it out on the network:
ha
def= if inp(hi) = ε then NC :: KC :: SignK−1
C
(C :: KC )
else case inp(ah) of s1 :: s2 :: s3
do case ExtKCA (s3) of S :: x
do if {DecKC (s2)}x = y :: NC :: KC then {m}y
else abort
else abort
else abort
ho
def= if inp(hi) = ε then ε
else case inp(ah) of s1 :: s2 :: s3
do case ExtKCA (s3) of S :: x
do if {DecKC (s2)}x = y :: NC :: KC then ﬁnished
else ε
else ε
else ε
hi
def= 0
pc
def= if inp(co) = ε then ε else {inp(co)}K
ci
def= if inp(ho) = ﬁnished then ok else ε
We have the conditional interface reﬁnement Pc
(D,U)
T P⊗H where
• T ⊆ StreamOPc × StreamIPc consists of those (s, t) such that for any n, if (s(c˜i))i /= ﬁnished for all i  n then (s(c˜o))i = ε
for all i  n + 1
• and D and U have channel sets ID = {c˜o, a˜c}, OD = {co, ac , ah}, IU = {ci, pc ,ha} and OU = {c˜i, p˜c} and are speciﬁed by
co
def= inp(c˜o), ac def= inp(a˜c), ah def= inp(a˜c),
c˜i
def= inp(ci), p˜c def= inp(ha)
(after renaming the channels of Pc to c˜o, c˜i, p˜c , a˜c).
Therefore, for anyCwith [[C]] ⊆ T , we have an interface reﬁnementC⊗Pc (D,U) C⊗P⊗H. Since for anyC, the composition
C⊗Pc preserves the secrecy of the messages sent along c0, as noted above, this implies that for any C with [[C]] ⊆ T , the
composition C⊗P⊗H preserves the secrecy of these messages by Theorem 2 (since D and U clearly have inverses).
7. Translating programs to ﬁrst-order logic formulas
Weexplain our translation fromprograms in the DSL deﬁned earlier in this paper to ﬁrst-order logic (FOL) formulaswhich
can be processed by automated theorem provers (ATPs) for ﬁrst-order logic such as e-SETHEO or SPASS. The formalization
automatically derives an upper bound for the set of knowledge the adversary can gain.
The idea is to use a predicate knows(E)meaning that the adversarymay get to know E during the execution of the protocol.
For any data value s supposed to remain secret, one thus has to check whether one can derive knows(s). The set of predicates
deﬁned to hold for a given program in the DSL deﬁned earlier is deﬁned as follows.
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Fig. 6. Structural formulas.
Fig. 7. Deﬁnition of φ(p).
For each publicly known expression E, one deﬁnes knows(E) to hold (in particular for the emptymessage ε, and in the case
of the TLS variant from Section 5 also for the message abort). The fact that the adversary may enlarge his set of knowledge
by constructing new expressions from the ones he knows (including the use of encryption and decryption) is captured by
the formula in Fig. 6.
For a given program p in our DSL, we now deﬁne the ﬁrst-order logic formula φ(p) used to represent p for the purposes of
the security analysis. The deﬁnition is given in Fig. 7 and is analogous to the deﬁnition of the formal semantics in Fig. 3. For
the usages of E ∈ Exp in Fig. 7, the assumption is that there are n occurrences of input expressions in E, and E(i1, . . . , in) is the
expression derived from E by substituting these occurrences by the variables i1, . . . , in. Similarly, for E
′ ∈ Exp, the assumption
is that there arem occurrences of input expressions in E′, and E′(j1, . . . , jm) is the expression derived from E′ by substituting
these occurrences by the variables j1, . . . , jm. Also, we assume that the predicate key(K) is true iff K is a key.
The formula formalizes the fact that, if the adversary knows expressions exp1, . . . , expn validating the condition
cond(exp1, . . . , expn), then he can send them to one of the protocol participants to receive the message exp(exp1, . . . ,expn) in
exchange, and then the protocol continues. With this formalization, a data value s is said to be kept secret if it is not possible
to derive knows(s) from the formulas deﬁned by a protocol. Note that here we abstract from themessage sender and receiver
identities (because we do not want to make the assumption that sender and receiver identities are securely bound to the
messages, which is one reason why one needs cryptographic protocols to start with) and the message order (because the
adversary may be able to change the order of messages while in transit over the communication channel).
Suppose now that we are given a process P = (I,O, L, (pc)c∈O) where I,O, L are the sets of input, ouput, and local channels.
For a program p associated with a non-local output channel, this gives a predicate PRED(p) where expressions of the
form knows(ik) (where ik is an input received over a local input channel) are substituted by the expression sent(ik). If p is
associated with a local output channel, the expression knows(E(i1, . . . , in)) in the ﬁrst line of Fig. 7 is similarly substituted by
sent(E(i1, . . . , in)). Additionally, we assume sent(ε) as an axiom (where we recall that ε represents the emptymessage). These
modiﬁcations capture the fact that the adversary cannot read from or write to local channels. Note that the sent predicate
gives an upper bound on the data that may be sent over the local channels. This means that the adversary knowledge set
is approximated from above. In particular, one will ﬁnd all possible attacks, but one may also encounter “false positives”,
although this has not happened yet with any real examples. The advantage is that this approach is rather efﬁcient (see
Section 7.2 for some performance data).
Theaxioms in theoverallﬁrst-order logic formula foragivenprotocol are then theconjunctionof the formulas representing
the publicly known expressions, the formula in Fig. 6, and the conjunction of the formulas PRED(p) for each program p
implementing a part of the protocol (with themodiﬁcations explained in the previous paragraph). The conjecture, for which
the automated theorem prover will check whether it is derivable from the axioms, depends on the security requirements
contained in the class diagram. For the requirement that the data value s is to be kept secret, the conjecture is knows(s). An
example is given in the next section.
Note that, as before, the generalizations to cover multiple parallel sessions and insider attackers also extend to the
translation to FOL. For the case of insider attackers, this is immediate since it simply results in a different protocol model,
which can be translated in the same way. For multiple parallel sessions, one has data values that are parameterized over the
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protocol roles (such as client and server) which are modelled by free variables, and the axioms then need to be closed using
forall-quantiﬁers for each such free variable.
7.1. Translating the TLS variant
To explain the translation deﬁned above, we apply it to the DSL program constructed for the TLS variant in Section 5. We
explain this translation in a stepwise manner for each of the DSL sub-programs deﬁned for the TLS variant.
For the output channels aC , aA, aS of the certiﬁcation authority, as well as the trivial local channel l, the translation is
particularly easy. The ﬁrst line in the deﬁnition in Fig. 7 applies and since the relevant expressions do not contain input
channels, the resulting subformulas reduce to rather simple logical predicates (where ∼= denotes equivalence of the logical
formulae):
φ(aC ) ∼= knows(KCA)
φ(aA) ∼= knows(KCA :: SignK−1
CA
(S :: KS) :: SignK−1
CA
(Z :: KZ ))
φ(aS) ∼= knows(SignK−1
CA
(S :: KS))
φ(aS) ∼= sent(0)
For the program deﬁning the behavior on channel c, the ﬁrst line of the deﬁnition reduces to a similarly simple formula
(whichwill be a conjunct within the overall formula φ(c)): According to the deﬁnition for the then-branch of an if-statement
given in Fig. 7, we get a conjunct which simply reduces to knows(NC :: KC :: SignK−1
C
(C :: KC )) (since sent(ε) holds as a given
axiom and φ(NC :: KC :: SignK−1
C
(C :: KC )) ∼= knows(NC :: KC :: SignK−1
C
(C :: KC ))). For the else-case in this if-statement, we get
a second conjunct in the overall formula φ(c) which reduces to the following formula (and additionally formulae which
imply knows(ε) and knows(abort), which can be ignored since that already is part of the general axioms and to simplify the
presentation):
∀s1, s2, s3, a1, x, y. (knows(s1) ∧ knows(s2) ∧ knows(s3) ∧ knows(a1) ∧
{s3}a1 = S :: x ∧ {DecK−1
C
(s2)}x = y :: NC ⇒knows({m}y))
Finally, φ(s) reduces to the following formula (again abstracting away from knows(ε) and knows(abort)):
∀c1, c2, c3, a1, x. (knows(c1) ∧ knows(c2) ∧ knows(c3) ∧ knows(a1) ∧
{c3}c2 = x :: c2 ⇒knows(NS :: {SignK−1
S
(KCS :: c1)}c2 :: a1))
Altogether, the DSL program that implements the TLS variant given in Section 5 thus translates to a logical formula that
reduces to the simpliﬁed formula given in Fig. 8. This formula is given as an axiom to the ATP in conjunctionwith the general
axioms deﬁned in the last section, as we will explain in the following section.
7.2. Protocol analysis with automated theorem provers for FOL
In this section, we explain how the automated analysis of programs in the DSL are performed using the translation to
FOL deﬁned at the beginning of this section. For that, the resulting FOL formula is converted to the TPTP notation, which is
Fig. 8. Protocol part of the translation of the TLS variant to FOL.
68 J. Jürjens / Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming 78 (2009) 54–73
the de-facto input notation for ﬁrst-order logic automated theorem provers [35], supported, using existing converters, by a
variety of provers including e-SETHEO, Otter, SPASS, Vampire, and Waldmeister.
The prover SETHEO is an efﬁcient automated theorem prover for ﬁrst oder logic in clausal normal form, extended to
the prover e-SETHEO for reasoning about equality properties [28,34]. We use e-SETHEO for verifying security protocols as a
“black box”: A TPTP input ﬁle is presented to the ATP and an output from the ATP is observed. No internal properties of or
information from e-SETHEO is used. This allows one to use e-SETHEO interchangingly with any other ATP accepting TPTP as
an input format (such as SPASS, Vampire and Waldmeister) when it may seem ﬁt.
The results of the theorem prover have to be interpreted as follows: If the conjecture stating for example that the
adversarymay get to know the secret can be derived from the axiomswhich formalize the adversarymodel and the protocol
speciﬁcation, this means that there may be an attack against the protocol.
We then use an attack generation script programmed in Prolog to construct the attack. The script essentially implements
the above FOL formalization in Prolog. The advantage of a Prolog implementation is that one can directly query the variable
contents (i.e., the messages that are exchanged) when an attack is found. The disadvantage of the Prolog implementation is
that it is signiﬁcantly less efﬁcient and complete in the case of secure protocols (which is why we use the FOL prover ﬁrst,
and the Prolog generator only if the prover found that there may be an attack). Note that the Prolog script only generates
the message sequence from the attack scenario (as shown in Fig. 5; see [18] for the actual output of the tool). The user then
needs to manually improve on the original DSL speciﬁcation on the basis of this information.
If the conjecture cannot be derived from the axioms, this constitutes a proof that the protocol is securewith respect to the
security requirement formalized as the negation of the conjecture, because logical derivation is sound and complete with
respect to semantic validity for ﬁrst-order logic. Note that since ﬁrst-order logic in general is undecidable, it can happen that
the ATP is not able to decide whether a given conjecture can be derived from a given set of axioms. However, experience has
shown that for a reasonable set of protocols and security requirements, our approach is in fact practical.
In our example, e-SETHEO returns as an output that the conjection knows(secret) can be derived from the deﬁned rules
(within 3 s).2 For this example the attack tracking tool needs around 20 s to produce the attack which was visualized earlier
in Fig. 5. See [18] for the actual outputs of the tools.
As explained earlier, we can ﬁx this problemby substituting K :: NC in the secondmessage (server to client) byK :: NC :: KC
and by including a check regarding this newmessage part at the client. Now the newversion can be veriﬁed by the automated
theoremprover approach.When e-SETHEO runs on the ﬁxed version of the protocol it now gives back the result that the con-
jecture knows(secret) cannot be derived from the axioms formalizing the protocol, within 5 s. Again, see [18] for the tool out-
put, which shows that, within the e-SETHEO suite, the prover “eprover” was able to establish that there is no such derivation
by exhaustively trying all possibilities. Note that this result means that there actually exists no such derivation, not just that
the theoremprover is not able to ﬁnd it. Thismeans in particular that the attacker cannot gain the secret knowledge anymore.
Note that this a non-trivial result: The translation from the DSL into FOL deﬁned above accommodates the fact that, for
example, the attacker can construct messages of arbitrary size from his knowledge (e.g. lists of arbitrary length, or message
of arbitrary encryption depth). We leave it up to the ATPs we use (such as e-SETHEO and SPASS) to deal with this veriﬁcation
challenge. This allows us not only to use different ATPs in an interchangeable way, which increases the overall robustness of
the approach. It also allows us to exploit the signiﬁcant amount of work that has been done regarding automated theorem
proving, which is already encapsulated in these tools. In particular, using our translation, the challenge of dealing with the
fact that the adversary may construct messages of arbitrary size, is embedded into the challenge of dealing with the fact
that there exist derivations of arbitrary size, when trying to determine whether a conjecture can be derived from a set of
axioms. The latter is of course the main challenge that has to be addressed by automated theorem provers which aim for a
maximum feasible level of completeness. Althoughwe cannot hope for a complete, automated solution for problem instances
of arbitrary difﬁculty (because of the undecidability of this problem), encouraging improvements have been made in this
regards over the last years, which we aim to exploit using our approach. Note also that if necessary, the approach presented
here (which is particularly suitable to derive attacks) can also be fruitfully combined with complementary approaches such
as [33,9] which are targeted on deriving security proofs.
Note that the security result above of course in itself is bound to the particular executionmodel and the formalizations of
the security requirements used here. Note also that the approach does not aim to be complete in the sense that the security
analysis may falsely claim that there may be an attack against the speciﬁed system, because of the optimizing abstractions
used. This, however, has not so far surfaced as a limitation in practical applications. If it would, one would be able to detect
that the attack is unrealistic when generating the attack scenario using the Prolog attack generator mentioned above.
A prototypical implementation of the tool-support, which performs a translation from a state machine representation of
the protocol to the FOL formulas in the TPTP format, can be downloaded as open source from [18].
8. Test case generation
In previous sections,we explained howone can create executable but formally foundedmodels of cryptographic protocols
using theDSLpresentedearlier,which canbeveriﬁedagainst security requirements suchas secrecyusing automated theorem
2 On a SunFire 3800 (4 processors, 6 GByte RAM, Solaris 9).
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Fig. 9. Deﬁnition of φ(p).
Fig. 10. Generated Prolog script for TLS variant (fragment).
provers. In this section, we explain how to use the DSL programs to provide security assurance for implementations of
cryptographic protocols in other programming languages, by generating test-sequences from the DSL programs that can be
used to verify these implementations.
The approach works by constructing a program in the DSL which can be formally analyzed as explained above, and
then using this program to generate the test-cases for the legacy implementation. The goal is to show that the legacy
implementation implements a behavior which is equivalent to that of the DSL program in a suitable sense, which in turnwas
veriﬁed to be secure. We explain the application at the case of implementations in the Java language. Below we ﬁrst explain
how abstract message sequences can be constructed using using Prolog generated from the DSL speciﬁcations. We then
explain how the abstract message sequences can be concretized in order to be fed into the crypto protocol implementations.
To generate the abstractmessage sequences, wemake use of Prolog scripts that are generated from the DSL speciﬁcations,
similar to the attack generation scripts mentioned in the previous subsection. These are essentially a Prolog based imple-
mentation of the translation from the DSL speciﬁcations to FOL which was deﬁned earlier, except that we do not need the
formulas which deﬁne how the adversary can construct new knowledge, and that we can deﬁne directly how the outputs
are computed from the inputs (which are generated independently) using the Prolog script, without needing the knows
predicate. See Fig. 9 for the core part of this adapted translation. The input expressions inp(c) (for a channel c) contained
in an expression E are evaluated by substituting them with the input value at the relevant channel at a given point in time
during the execution. In Fig. 10 we give a fragment of the Prolog script that is generated for the ﬁrst twomessages of the TLS
variant from previous sections using the translation explained above (see [18] for the complete Prolog script), and in Fig. 11
one of the message sequences generated by that Prolog script.
We now explain how the abstract message sequences can be concretized in order to be fed into the crypto protocol
implementations. The challenge here in the case of testing cryptographic protocols is that these make signiﬁcant use of
(pseudo-)random algorithms, for example to generate one-time values (nonces) or to make ciphertexts unpredictable and
harder to crypto-analyze. These algorithms are designed to withstand brute-force attacks. Therefore onemight not expect to
be able to test a systemmaking use of them in a sufﬁciently exhaustiveway using black-box testing. Also, one faces difﬁculties
when trying to compare randomly generated values that were created independently by the implementation under test and
the test oracle, since these will in general be different.
Fig. 11. One message sequence generated by the Prolog script in Fig. 10.
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Instead we make use of white-box testing. This requires to have the source code available, but fortunately that is the
case for important crypto-protocol implementations in Java, such as the Java Secure Sockets Extension (JSSE) recently made
open-source by Sun.
To instrument the code for the testing, we replace all occurrences of calls ofmethods that correspond to the cryptographic
functions in our DSL (such as randomnumber generation, key generation, encryption, decryption, and signature creation and
veriﬁcation) bymethods that not only call these functions, but in addition also build up a table that deﬁnes a correspondence
between the concrete cryptographic data that is constructed and the corresponding symbolic expressions (as deﬁned in
Fig. 1). For example, we replace each occurrence of a call to a method which generates random values (such as nextBytes
from java.security.SecureRandom) by amethodwhich calls the samemethod, but in addition stores the return value in a list.
Similarly, we need to treat the input/output behavior of the crypto-protocol implementation necessary for the protocol
communication. In Java-based implementation such as JSSE or the open-source SSL implementation Jessie, the proto-
col communication is implemented using message buffers to which messages to be sent are written (using the method
Fig. 12. Security monitor algorithm.
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java.io.OutputStream.write), and from which messages that are received are read. Accordingly, to instrument the code for
testing, calls to java.io.OutputStream.write are replaced by calls of a new method which not only includes the original call to
java.io.OutputStream. write but also records its arguments in a separate buffer. During the testing phase, the messages in that
buffer are then compared to the messages that should be sent according to the given speciﬁcation (as produced by the DSL
program), as explained inmore detail in the paragraphs below. If this comparison fails, the given test-case fails. Analogously,
the calls of java.io.OutputStream.read (which reads the messages that are received from the buffer) are instrumented such
that in addition to reading themessages from the buffer as usual, the values are linked to the representation on the symbolic
level as input channels, as deﬁned in Fig. 1. Note that this does not impose any constraint on the well-formedness of the
input messages that arrive, since the procotol implementation should also be tested to be secure when receiving a message
that is not well-formed as speciﬁed by the protocol design.
To perform the comparison of themessages that are sentwith the values that should be sent according to the speciﬁcation,
we need to generate concrete values out of the abstract values contained in the speciﬁcation. This concretization can be
achieved using the mappings between abstract and concrete data that are constructed using the code instrumentation
explained above. We give some more details on how this works. First, we ﬁx a set of transaction variables TransV and deﬁne
a concretization of abstract messages by mapping each abstract message type M from Fig. 1 to a sequence concrete(M) :
dM
1
, dM
2
, . . . , dMnM of concrete data elements d
M
i
. dM
i
can be
• a concrete data value (corresponding to a constant sequence of bytes)
• a transaction variable (used to represent transaction data such as timestamps stored by the monitor)
• an abstract message as deﬁned in Fig. 1.
In the last case, the expression is evaluated and the result is again concretized. The transaction variables v ∈ TransV are
associated with a set values(v) of possible concrete values. In addition, each data element has to be assigned a ﬁeld length,
which we omit here for simpliﬁcation. Keys k are mapped directly to a transaction variable concrete(k) : dk
1
∈ TransV. The
actual concretization, i.e. the values for the dM
i
and values(v) must be provided by the developer.
An algorithm for the security monitor is given in Fig. 12. It uses the algorithms gen_sequence and verify_sequence to
generate concrete data from abstract input messages to a component, resp. to compare abstract output messages to the
concrete data received. In verify_sequence, ﬁrst(s) denotes the preﬁx of s corresponding to dM
i
, removeﬁrst(s) denotes the
remaining part of s. The messageM is referenced by “this”.
The idea of the algorithm is as follows. Constants in concrete(M) are passed directly to the implementation or compared
to the received data. If a transaction variable v appears in concrete(M) for an input message, either a new concrete value
is chosen for v and sent, or an already chosen value from the store store is sent (where the variable store contains a list of
concrete data values and is initially empty). When data is received corresponding to v, it is either compared to the value
already chosen, or the received value is added to the store. Encryptedmessages, hashes andmessage authentication codes can
be computed on sending using the data available. On reception, it is possible that the concrete byte sequence for a key or part
of the data to be hashed is not yet available to the security monitor, so for veriﬁcation, in gen_sequence arbitrary concrete
values that may not correspond to the actual values would be chosen and added to the store. In this case, instead a condition
is added to conditions (which is a variable that stores a list of logical conditions and is initially empty). The conditions are
veriﬁed by the security monitor as soon as they can be evaluated. The processing of messages by the security monitor is
repeated for each step of the data sequence (sending or receiving a message Mabstr to/from port p of the component that is
monitored). Note that a fresh store must be created for each new protocol session.
As an example, for the Java implementation of the SSL protocol in the Jessie project, the message parts recorded for the
ClientHello method are shown in Fig. 13.
9. Related work
Compared to research done using formal methods, less work has been done more generally using software engineering
techniques for computer security. For an overview of the topic see [10].
Otherwork in secure software engineeringwhich is basedon stream-processing functions includes [25],which introduces
a method for the formal development of secure systems based on FOCUS. It utilizes threat scenarios which are the result of
threat identiﬁcation and risk analysis andmodel those attacks that are of importance to the system’s security. Other examples
include the work reported in [37] (and the references there), which develops an approach for secure software engineering
using the CASE tool AutoFocus which includes work towards mutation-based testing [21].
In a more general context of model-based development of secure software, Fernandez and Hawkins [11] deﬁne role-
based access control rights from object-oriented use cases. Georg et al. [13] demonstrate how to use UML for aspect-oriented
development of security-critical systems. Design-level aspects are used to encapsulate security concerns that can be woven
into the models. Houmb et al. [15] use UML for the risk assessment of an e-commerce system within the CORAS framework
for model-based risk assessment. Fernández-Medina et al. [12] use UML for the design of secure databases. It proposes an
extension of the use case and class models of UML using their standard extension mechanisms designing secure databases.
Koch and Parisi-Presicce [23] demonstrate how to dealwith access control policies in UML. The speciﬁcation of access control
policies is integrated into UML. Lodderstedt et al. [24] and Basin et al. [4] showhowUML can be used to specify access control
in an application and how one can then generate access control mechanisms from the speciﬁcations. The approach is based
on role-based access control and gives additional support for specifying authorization constraints. Breu and Popp [5] present
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Fig. 13. Message stored from ClientHello.
an approach for the predicative speciﬁcation of user rights in the context of an object oriented use case driven development
process. As syntactic and semantic framework it uses ﬁrst-order logic with a built-in notion of objects and classes provided
with an algebraic semantics. Hafner et al. [14] present an extensible domain architecture for the collaborative development
and management of security-critical, inter-organizational workﬂows where models integrate security requirements at the
abstract level and are rendered in a visual language based on UML 2.0.
There is too much work on verifying cryptographic protocols to give a complete overview. Overviews of applications
of formal methods to security protocols can be found for example in [1,27,32,16], some examples in [22,26,2,29]. Another
approaches to using ﬁrst-order logic ATPs for cryptoprotocol analysis include the following: Schumann [33] formalizes the
well-known BAN logic in ﬁrst-order logic and uses the ATP SETHEO to proof statements in the BAN logic. It is different
from our approach which is based on the knowledge of the adversary, instead of the beliefs of the protocol participants.
Weidenbach [36] uses the ATP SPASS to verify crypto protocols. Cohen [9] uses ﬁrst-order invariants to verify cryptographic
protocols against safety properties. The approach is supported by the ATP TAPS. Compared to our approach, themethod does
not generate counter-examples (that is, attacks) in case a protocol is found to be insecure.
So far there does not seem to exist a domain-speciﬁc language for crypographic protocols in the literaturewhich has been
used to provide assurance for crypto-protocol implementation by generating test-cases.
10. Conclusion
We present a domain-speciﬁc language for crypto protocol implementations which can be used to construct a compact
and precise yet executable representation of a cryptographic protocol. This high-level program can be translated to ﬁrst
order logic with equality and then veriﬁed against the security goals using automated theorem provers for ﬁrst order logic.
If the analysis reveals that there could be an attack against the protocol, the theorem prover is again called using an attack
generator written in Prolog to produce an attack scenario. The protocol can then be corrected by the designer, and the
process repeated. One can then use the DSL program to provide assurance for legacy implementations of crypto protocols by
generating test-cases. We explained our approach at the hand of a variant of the Internet protocol TLS. The tools presented
here can be downloaded from [18] as open-source.
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